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J. Roger Edwards, Jr.
Almost every major railroad in the United States either is in-
volved currently in merger proceedings or is entertaining the idea.1
Indeed, the railroads are setting a blistering pace in attempts to
secure the most advantageous alignment. If proposals fail in one
quarter, out come the maps and the search is on for another suitable
partner. In this atmosphere, a heavy premium is placed on early
agreement. Those unable to negotiate successfully may find that
alignments between other railroads have created a situation in which
substantial amounts of their traffic will be diverted to the newly
merged systems. The smaller roads even may be forced into a merger
at unfavorable exchange rates.
'For a list of merger proposals already approved and others now pending before the
ICC, see Hearings on Rail Merger Legislation Before the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust
and Monopoly, 87th Congress, 2d Sess., Pt. 2, at 1146 (1962). As of August 1, 1964, the
status of merger and control applications were as follows:
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21215 Seaboard Air Line-
Atlantic Coast Line merger*
21313 Illinois Central control
of Louisville & Nashville
21314 Southern Pacific control
of Western Pacific
21334 Atchison, Topeka &





21510 Norfolk & Western-New
York, Chicago & St. Louis
merger***
21755 Missouri Pacific control
of Chicago & Eastern Illinois
21773 Louisville & Nashville
control of Chicago & Eastern
Illinois
* Commission's report made Dec. 2.
** Commission's report made August







(deferred pending decision in 2121$)





3-17-61 10-10-61 5-2-62 4-10-63
9-19-61 (consolidated with 21892) 9-26-63
9-28-61 (withdrawn)
(Continued on page 440)
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This merger movement does not represent a new phenomenon in
the American economy, but it differs from previous movements in
several respects. First, the railroad industry no longer is a natural
monopoly. Trucks, barges, and pipelines have made inroads into its
freight position; private cars, buses, and airlines now compete with
it for passenger business. Second, in order to regain financial health,
railroads are using merger as a means to reduce fixed costs and thus
attain more efficient operations.! Third, the Interstate Commerce
Commission has aided the movement. The result: a good chance rail-
roads will be consolidated into regional systems.
BUREAU OF FINANCE






control of Chicago &
Eastern Illinois
21920 Norfolk & Western




22235 Norfolk & Western lease
of Pittsburgh & West
Virginia
22274 Texas & Pacific control
of Kansas, Oklahoma &
Gulf, Midland Valley and
Oklahoma City-Ada-Atoka
22382 Atchison, Topeka &
Santa Fe control of
Oklahoma City-Ada-Atoka
22465 Atchison, Topeka &
Santa Fe; Gulf, Colorado
and Santa Fe; Panhandle and
Santa Fe; and Kansas City,
Mexico and Orient merger
22688 Chicago & North Western
control of Chicago, Rock
Island & Pacific
22951 Missouri Pacific, Texas









1-10-62 7-18-62 7-19-62 4-10-63
3-9-62 8-20-62 10-2-63
8-21-62 10-30-62 10-31-62 4-10-63
9-28-62 1-21-63 3-20-63 11-6-63
12-18-62 (consolidated with 22274)
2-14-63 6-24-63 9-11-63
7-5-63 (hearings deferred awaiting related
application by UP and SP)
1-28-64
' Although the railroad industry generally has not prospered in recent years, the eastern
district railroads perhaps have suffered more than their share of the financial problems.
For example, as of 1961 the eastern district roads represented between 34% and 38%o of
the industry (measured by funded debt outstanding, number of employees, freight cars,
locomotives, state and local taxes, total operating revenues, and net investment), yet they
lagged behind in such important financial indicators as gross capital expenditures (22%7),
dividends paid (10o), and net operating income (none). Also in 1961, the net income
for the eastern roads was a deficit equaling more than 25% of the industry's net earnings.
A defiicit in working capital also existed. Id. at 930.
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Opposition to this movement, however, is not lacking. Shippers,
unions, cities, states, other railroads, and the Department of Justice
frequently oppose mergers in order to protect legitimate interests
which each has. The Railway Labor Executives Association, composed
of leaders of the various labor unions, voiced its disapproval of the
ICC's merger policy in these terms: merger approvals should be the
responsibility of "an agency that is not ridden with bureaucratic
incompetence and dominated by the interests they [sic] are supposed
to regulate." 3
I. HISTORY OF RAILROAD MERGERS
There have been several distinct periods in which railroad merger
activity either was intense or noticeably absent.' Prior to 1904,
railroads merged whenever possible. Between 1904 and 1920, mergers
were prevented by law and few occurred After 1920 the govern-
ment supported consolidations, but few were completed prior to the
recent movement. The regulation of railroads began with the Inter-
state Commerce Act,' passed in 1887, which subjected them to
regulation because of their discriminatory and monopolistic pricing
practices. The Sherman Act followed in 1890.! In cases before the
Supreme Court in 1897' and in 1899,"5 plausible arguments were
made for exemption of railroads from the antitrust laws because of
the Interstate Commerce Act. In both cases the Court held the
antitrust laws applicable to railroads and found that the defendants
had violated section 1 of the Sherman Act by fixing prices. The
antitrust laws, however, were not applied specifically to railroad
mergers until 1904 in Northern Sec. Co. v. United States."
In the sixteen years that followed Northern Securities, the anti-
trust laws effectively thwarted all attempts at consolidation. This
policy was relaxed by the Transportation Act of 1920," passed to
SWall Street Journal, Dec. 27, 1960, p. 2, cols. 2 and 3.
'Railroad mergers are not new. For example, the present 500 or more railroads represent
a combination of what was once 6,000 roads. The Pennsylvania Railroad system was once
600 roads. Staff of Senate Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 87th Cong., Ist
Sess., Preliminary Draft of Report on National Transportation Policy 229 (Comm. Print
1961) [hereinafter cited as Doyle Report].
'See text accompanying and following notes 9 and 10 infra.
I See text accompanying and following note 12 infra.
124 Stat. 379 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1958).
s26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1958).
United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
"United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898).11193 U.S. 197 (1904).




retrieve railroads from precarious financial condition.' This was to
be accomplished by consolidating financially sound roads with weaker
ones. Under the 1920 act, ICC approval of a merger gave it immu-
nity from the antitrust laws." A limitation, however, that "competi-
tion shall be preserved as fully as possible and whenever practicable
the existing routes and channels of trade and commerce shall be
maintained" was to be imposed by the Commission." The plan was a
failure. First, the act made consolidation voluntary, and strong car-
riers were very reluctant to merge with weak roads. Second, in ac-
cordance with the congressional mandate, Professor William Z.
Ripley of Harvard submitted to the ICC a plan which grouped all
of the railroads into twenty-one systems.' After alteration, the plan
finally was approved by the ICC in 1929," but its rigidity proved to
be too great. As a result, little merger activity followed. During the
depression the financial plight of the railroads again led Congress to
become interested in consolidations. The Emergency Railroad Trans-
portation Act of 1933" authorized the ICC to approve mergers
found to be in the public interest and in harmony with the overall
plan of consolidation under the 1920 act.
In the Transportation Act of 1940," Congress abandoned two pro-
visions that were in the previous statutes. First, the Commission was
relieved of its duty to promulgate a national consolidation plan,
leaving the power to initiate mergers entirely to the carriers." Second,
the specific reference to the "preservation of competition whenever
possible" was removed from the statute. In place of these provisions
Congress admonished the ICC to give weight to the following con-
siderations, among others: (1) the effect of the proposed transaction
upon adequate transportation service to the public; (2) the effect
upon the public interest of the inclusion of, or failure to include,
""The major issue facing Congress then was to prevent a complete breakdown of the
railroad transportation system because of the precarious financial condition of the weak
roads." Doyle Report, op. cit. supra note 4, at 233.
24The theory was that such mergers would allow equal rates to be charged on a fair
basis. It was felt that in the absence of such a program, a rate providing the sound roads
with a reasonable return would destroy the weaker ones. On the other hand, rates providing-
weak roads with reasonable returns would give the stronger companies excessive returns.
Doyle Report, op. cit. supra note 4, at 234.
"Transportation Act of 1920, ch. 91, § 407, 41 Stat. 482 (now 49 U.S.C. § 5 (11)
(1958)). "[A]ny carriers . . . participating in a transaction approved or authorized under
the provisions of this section shall be and they are hereby relieved from the operation of
the 'antitrust laws' .. "
1" Transportation Act of 1920, ch. 91, § 407, 41 Stat. 481.
"Consolidation of Railroads, 63 I.C.C. 455 (1921).
"a Consolidation of Railroads, 159 I.C.C. 522 (1929).
"948 Stat. 211 (1933), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 5 (1958).
"o 54 Stat. 898 (1940) (codified in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
21 54 Stat. 905 (1940), 49 U.S.C. § 5(2) (b) (1958).
[Vol. 18
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other railroads in the region in the proposed transaction; (3) the
total fixed charges resulting from the proposed transaction; and (4)
the interest of the carrier employees affected.2 These tests were quali-
fied by the National Transportation Policy found in the preamble to
the act.23 Unfortunately, this policy statement is even more vague
than the criteria specified in the statute.
In 1922, the immunity clause was upheld in the courts." And as
early as 1932 in New York Cent. Sec. Corp. v. United States," the
ICC's approval of a merger of parallel competing lines was upheld.
However, definitive treatment of the proper Commission approach to
competition did not occur until 1944 in McLean Trucking Co. v.
United States.2" In McLean, which upheld a merger of trucking firms
under section 5 (2) of the Interstate Commerce Act," the Court
stated:
In short, the Commission must estimate the scope and appraise the
effects of the curtailment of competition which will result from the
proposed consolidation and consider them along with the advantages
of improved service, safer operation, lower costs, etc. to determine
whether consolidation will assist in effectuating the over-all transporta-
tion policy. . . . ..The wisdom and experience of that Commission,"
not of the courts, must determine whether the proposed consolidation
is "consistent with the public interest.""
22 54 Stat. 905 (1940), 49 U.S.C. § 5(2) (c) (1958). With respect to employees,
§ 5(2) (f) requires that they not be in a worse position after the merger than before it
for a minimum period of four years.
22 It is hereby declared to be the national transportation policy of the Congress
to provide for fair and impartial regulation of all modes of transportation
subject to the provisions of this Act, so administered as to recognize and
preserve the inherent advantages of each; to promote safe, adequate, eco-
nomical and efficient service and foster sound economic conditions in trans-
portation and among the several carriers; to encourage the establishment and
maintenance of reasonable charges for transportation services, without unjust
discrimination, undue preferences or advantages, or unfair or destructive
competitive practices; to cooperate with the several States and the duly
authorized officials thereof; and to encourage fair wages and equitable working
conditions; -all to the end of developing, coordinating, and preserving a na-
tional transportation system by water, highway, and rail, as well as other
means, adequate to meet the needs of commerce of the United States, of the
Postal Service, and of the national defense. 54 Stat. 899 (1940).
2 The Supreme Court originally ordered dissolution of a railroad merger, United
States v. Southern Pac. R.R., 259 U.S. 214 (1922), but the merger was upheld after
the parties obtained ICC approval. Control of Central Pacific by Southern Pacific, 76
I.C.C. 508 (1923), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Southern Pacific R.R., 290 Fed. 443
(D. Utah 1923).
2 287 U.S. 12 (1932). "The fact that the carriers' lines are parallel and competing
cannot be deemed to affect the validity of the authority conferred upon the Commission. ...
The question of whether the acquisition of control will aid in preventing injurious waste
and in securing more efficient transportation service is committed to the judgment of the
administrative agency upon the facts developed in the particular case." Id. at 25-26.
26321 U.S. 67 (1944).
27 24 Star. 379 (1887), as amended, 54 Stat. 905 (1940), 49 U.S.C. § 5(2) (1958).
."McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67, 87-88 (1944).
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In a dissent, however, Justice Douglas reasoned:
Congress did not give the Commission carte blanche authority to substi-
tute a cartel for a competitive system. It may do so only when that step
will be consistent with the public interest. . . . But since the "public
interest" includes principles of free enterprise, which have long dis-
tinguished our economy, I can hardly believe that Congress intended
them to be swept aside unless they were in fact obstacles to the realiza-
tion of the national transportation policy."
This case touched off a debate which is still lively today." If under
the Supreme Court's test the " 'wisdom and experience of the Com-
mission,' not of the courts, must determine whether the proposed
consolidation is 'consistent with the public interest,' " the ICC's ap-
proach in defining the public interest and the relative weight given
various criteria which make up the public interest become highly
significant. 1
29 Id. at 94.
50 A more recent Supreme Court case which simply reaffirmed the principles espoused
by the majority in the McLean case is Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. v. United States, 361
U.S. 173 (1959). The case has little significance from an antitrust standpoint because the
line absorbed had only 225 employees and was only 234 miles long. In addition, the
Commission required that all present channels be kept open and that the line continue
operations under independent management.
Agency decisions of today discuss competition in the language of the Clayton Act.
38 Stat. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1958). The phrase in § 7 (49 U.S.C. § 18),
"substantially lessen competition," actually looks to future consequences and is tailored for
the merger situation. The exemption power under 41 Stat. 482 (1920), 49 U.S.C. § 5(11)
(1958) also includes the Clayton Act, however; thus, it is useful only as a statement of
policy and as a tool for determining the competitive effects of a merger. See United States
v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); Pan American World Airways v. United
States, 371 U.S. 296 (1963); California v. FPC, 369 U.S. 482 (1962); Beverly, Railroad
Mergers: The Forces of Internzodal Competition, 50 A.B.A.J. 641 (1964).
31 In 1926 the Commission denied an application of the Norfolk & Western to control
the Virginian by lease because the transaction would substantially lessen competition.
Control of Virginian Ry. by Norfolk & W. Ry., 117 I.C.C. 67 (1926). Thirty-three years
later the Commission did an about face and approved a merger between these very com-
panies, even though they were two of the most profitable lines in the country. Norfolk &
W. Ry.-Merger-Virginian Ry., 307 I.C.C. 401 (1959). The two roads are not parallel,
but it was estimated that savings of 12 million dollars per year would be achieved during
a five-year period because of coordination of yards, shops, and terminals; integration of
administrative accounting and soliciting; better use of facilities; and better movement of
eastbound coal. The Commission commented:
Conditions and circumstances existing today, some 34 years after the lease
proposal, make our decision in the control case inapposite .... [T]he situation
in which railroads find themselves now is hardly that of 1925. Then the
railroads were a virtual monopoly; now they are struggling to exist against
mounting competition. Then there were few roads and no organized intercity
motor carriers of consequence; now we have a network of fine intercity high-
ways and a thriving motor carrier industry.
The railroads are also facing constantly increasing competition from inland
waterways operators. Id. at 417.
In 1957 the ICC approved the acquisition of the Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis
Railroad by the Louisville & Nashville Railroad. Louisville & N.R.R. Merger, 295 I.C.C.
457 (1957). These companies estimated that the merger would result in savings of 3 4
million dollars per year within five years. Actually, the applicant companies had long
COMMENTS
Uncertainties exist in this field because neither Congress nor the
Commission ever has indicated at what point the preservation of
competition becomes more essential to the public interest than pro-
posed advantages of a merger. Indeed, there is confusion even over
what approach the Commission should utilize in assessing the anti-
competitive effects of merger. Although generalization is difficult,
the ICC apparently regards the following considerations as important
in proposed mergers: (1) proximity of intermodal competition, (2)
savings which can be achieved, and (3) financial condition of the
carriers. Perhaps one other observation needs to be made. Although
the companies whose mergers have been approved range from the
relatively small to the medium-large (the Minneapolis & St. Louis
had 2,400 employees while the Louisville Nashville had 22,000),
some of the mergers now pending before the ICC involve the financial
giants of the industry. The extent to which this factor will weaken
the case for approval is unknown.
II. THE REGULATORY SCHEME-AN ECONOMIC VIEW
The issues involved in merger litigation are meaningful only if
viewed within the context of the regulatory philosophy and its prac-
tical application. The extent to which regulation achieves its objec-
tives in daily practice is important because of the complex effects
the policy in one area may have on other areas of agency concern.
For example, the present rate making process and the abandonment
policy enforced by the ICC may have a significant effect, indeed it
may be the motivating factor, on a railway company's decision to
worked together, but the merger, by increasing diversification, created a more balanced
traffic pattern, thus permitting more effective competition with other modes and a more
efficient one-line service. Objections that Nashville would become a "one-railroad city"
were given little weight by the Commission because of vigorous intermodal competition
from pipelines, water transport, trucks, and airlines. Id. at 467-68.
Other acquisitions and mergers recently approved by the Commission: Norfolk &
Western-New York, Chicago & St. Louis Merger, - I.C.C. _ Finance Docket No.
21510, (June 24, 1964); Great Northern-Northern Pacific-Chicago, Burlington & Quincy
Merger, - I.C.C. -, Finance Docket No. 21478 (August 1964); Georgia & Fla. Ry.-
Acquisition-Georgia & Fla. R.R., 317 I.C.C. 745 (1963) (union of strong and weak to
preserve service); Southern Ry.-Control-Central of Ga. Ry., 317 I.C.C. 557 (1962);
Delaware, Lackawanna & W.R.R.-Erie R.R., 312 I.C.C. 185 (1960), aff'd sub nom.
Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees v. United States, 366 U.S. 169 (1961)
(both lines in financial trouble with estimated annual saving of 13 million dollars after
5 years); the Minneapolis & St. L. Ry.-Chicago & No. W. Ry., 295 I.C.C. 523 (1957),
aff'd sub noa. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. v. United States, 361 U.S. 173 (1959) (estimated
savings of 3 million dollars per year, acquisition unopposed).
The only significant proposal which the Commission turned down in recent years was
the St. Louis-San Francisco Railway's request to control the Central of Georgia Railway.
Central of Ga. Ry.-Control, 295 I.C.C. 563 (1957). The refusal was based on violations
of § 5(4) in purchasing stock before obtaining Commission approval. 54 Stat. 905
(1940), 49 U.S.C. § 5(4) (1958).
a Healy, The Effects of Scale in the Railroad Industry 746 (1961).
1964]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
merge. Because of the inter-relationship, a re-evaluation of the rate
making process and the abandonment policy as well as of the merger
policy would be sensible at a time of feverish railroad concentration.
In other words, if basic policy changes in other areas will provide the
benefits anticipated from a general policy favoring railroad consolida-
tions, without the disadvantages, those changes deserve serious con-
sideration.
In both railway and government circles, it is agreed that the indus-
try must undergo fundamental change if it is to prosper in the
future. The problem may be caused by the present industry struc-
ture-a problem that can be cured by merger. On the other hand,
there is substantial evidence to indicate that the financial problems of
the railroads can be traced to the regulatory legislation as admin-
istered by the ICC. In a Message from the President of the United
States Relative to the Transportation System of our Nation, President
Kennedy voiced the sentiment as follows:
The regulatory commissions are required to make thousands of detailed
decisions based on out-of-date standards. The management of the
various modes of transportation is subjected to excessive, cumbersome,
and time-consuming regulatory supervision that shackles and distorts
the managerial initiative. Some parts of the transportation industry are
restrained unnecessarily; others are promoted or taxed unevenly and
inconsistently."
The effect of operating under outmoded regulatory legislation has
been severe in the railroad industry. For instance, although railroads
once virtually monopolized the carriage of freight in the United
States, other modes, particularly the trucking industry, now carry
freight which once could be shipped most economically by rail."
The most important reason for this dislocation is the calculation of
rates without using cost as a base. This absence of cost-pricing is
3 H.R. Doc. No. 384, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1962).
"Percentage distribution of intercity ton miles by transport agency:
Motor Inland
Year Rail vehicle waterways' Pipeline
1939 62.3 9.7 18.7 10.2
1943 71.3 5.5 13.7 9.5
1947 65.2 10.1 14.4 10.3
1950 56.1 16.3 15.4 12.2
1954 49.5 19.0 15.5 15.9
1960 43.8 22.2 16.2 17.7
The inland water percentages include Great Lake freight movement which
declined from 11% to 71 between 1947 and 1960.
Meyer, Peck, Stenason & Zwick, The Economics of Competition in the Trans-




illustrated by (1) the rate bureau, (2) value-of-service rates, and
(3) abandonment policy.
A. The Rate Bureau
The rate bureau, legislatively sanctioned,"5 is a cooperative associa-
tion composed of all railroad companies in a particular region. It
exists primarily to set uniform rates for its members. Before a rate
adjustment proposed by an individual railroad becomes effective, it
must grind through the several levels of the bureau for approval. If
the adjustment fails to win bureau approval, the proposing company
may file the rate individually with the ICC. This procedure, how-
ever, rarely is utilized." The private administrative agency's ability
to maintain uniform rates has the dual effect of generally higher
prices being posted 7 and, because advance notice of proposed rate
adjustment is given, prevention of individual companies' gaining
competitive advantages through decreases in rates.3 " Those who favor
the rate bureau technique argue that, even in the absence of the
bureau, rates in competing markets would be identical because of
the oligopolistic nature of the industry. Moreover, they argue, collec-
tive action is necessary to establish joint rates for long hauls. Finally,
the expense of computing rates would burden individual companies
unduly. Generally, these arguments can be answered quite simply.
First, the existence of an oligopolistic market structure does not
compel the conclusion that rate bureaus are desirable (e.g., auto-
mobile industry). Second, collective establishment of joint rates
should not prevent experiments with rates for hauls entirely within
one system. Third, although the expenses per company might ma-
terially increase, this addition should be weighed against the dis-
advantages (cost and otherwise) arising from the inherent inertia of
the bureau system."' The time-consuming process involved in making
" The Reed-Bulwinkle Act, 62 Stat. 472 (1948) 49 U.S.C. § Sb (1958), exempts from
the operation of the Sherman Act those bureaus authorized by the ICC.
as Rate bureaus "dampen down the frequency of [independent action] and serve as a
deterrent, self-imposed and noncoercive, to the freedom of rate making." Conclusion of
Lloyd Garrison sitting as special master in Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S., 439
(1945) reported in 17 ICC Prac. J. 864, 869 (1950). "Although the Reed-Bulwinkle
Act protects the individual carriers' right to deviate from the traffic bureau rates, the
cost of reviewing the work of the bureau all but precludes its existence." Conant, Railroad
Consolidations and the Laws, 14 Stan. L. Rev. 489, 492 (1962).
"
TAir Freight Traffic Agreement, 14 C.A.B. 424, 428 (1951).
'ald. at 430.
39 The fact that "rate committees in practice operate on nearly unanimous rather than
majority decisions" indicates the difficulty a company might experience in attempting
major changes in rate policy. Meyer, Pech, Stenason & Zwick, The Economics of Competition
in the Transportation Industries 210 (1960).
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rate adjustments not only destroys intramodal competition, it also
prevents flexible reaction to competition from other modes. The re-
sult is an effective throttling of aggressive marketing policies by rate
bureau machinery."
B. Value-Of-Service Rate-Making4 '
The value-of-service method of determining rates originated and
developed during the period of rail monopoly of transportation
facilities. Because of the high ratio of fixed cost to variable cost in
a railroad operation, it was profitable for a railroad to charge a differ-
ent rate for each commodity commensurate with the product's ability
to pay. Thus, because transportation expenses constituted only a
minor portion of the total cost of high value goods, they were made
to bear high rates. The railroads then could profit by accepting lower
value products (bulk commodities) at any rate which covered more
than the marginal cost of carriage. Even though the railroads no
longer enjoy a monopoly position, this method of rate-making sur-
vives today largely because of historical accident and ICC sanction.
The inherent evil in a pricing system which does not reflect cost
lies in the misallocation of resources which may occur. In other words,
if under the value-of-service method of setting rates business is not
necessarily allocated to the "low cost" carrier, transportation resources
are wasted. The following analysis of carrier costs indicates that this
is precisely what has occurred. The cost comparisons between the
different transportation modes are presented in the traditional cate-
gories of (1) bulk commodities, (2) high value goods, and (3)
passenger service.
(1) A comparison of rail and water costs for transporting bulk
commodities reveals that the cost of water carriage by cargo ship,
tramp freighter, or barge is substantially less than rail long-run mar-
ginal line-haul cost. 2 Provided suitable commodities can be found in
sufficient quantity, pipelines may have costs as low as one-eighth of
rail line-haul cost for the same service."
(2) For high value goods, data indicate that piggyback line-haul
cost with a Clejan type car generally will equal only about one-third
40 This may be one reason why the railroads are unable to attract sufficient managerial
talent.
41 This section draws heavily from Meyer, op. cit. supra note 39, at 145, 168.
42 These conditions would prevail even if the rail carrier obtained loads per car of
60,000 to 70,000 pounds for the back haul and if the water carrier completed the back




the line-haul cost for trucks." The all rail line-haul cost per carload
likewise is less than the representative cost for trucks." In addition,
line-haul cost alone for carrying by boxcar loads in excess of 40,000
or 50,000 pounds is less than if carried by piggyback." A comparison
of rail and water carriage cost of transporting high value goods
indicates that railway transport has a substantial cost advantage."
(3) With the exception of short-haul, high density lines, rail mar-
ginal cost (generally less than average cost) for passenger carriage
is much higher than average cost for automobile travel and somewhat
above average cost for intercity bus travel. Air carriers, which offer
obvious service benefits, have costs that are competitive with both
first class and coach rail costs.
The foregoing examination suggests that the railroads definitely
serve an economic purpose in our transportation system. The data
indicate that if railroads were allowed to exploit their cost advantage
by pricing closer to marginal cost, a substantial amount of traffic in
" Comparative line-haul expenses for truck and piggyback transport:
(cents per revenue ton-mile)
Load per trailer Piggyback costs Highway





aPiggyback costs are long-run marginal (in 1952-1955 prices) and include
allowances for the variable portions of general overhead costs (also, efficiency
in this technique is reducing cost further through side loading of only the
trailer box).
b Highway truck costs are based on out-of-pocket (ie., roughly above average
variable) line haul vehicle mile costs of 27.3 cents, reported for American
Middlewest Common Carriers in 1953. Id. at 151.
45A comparison of long-run marginal line-haul costs of truck, piggyback, and carload
rail operations (1952-1955 cents per revenue mile).
Load per shipment Piggyback
(pounds) Truck Carloada (Clejan car)
20,000 2.73 1.161 0.857
30,000 1.82 0.878 .673
40,000 2.73b .738 .857
b
50,000 2.18' .653 .747'
60,000 1.82d .598 .673
d
70,000 2.34' .555 .778'
These cost estimates are based on average figures per gross ton mile of rail
operations as reported at the end of Chapter III. Train, general, traffic, line-
haul, switching, maintenance, and depreciation costs are included.
b Assumes shipment is broken down into two 20,000 pound trailer loads.
c Assumes shipment is broken down into one 20,000 and one 30,000 trailer
loads.
d Assumes two 30,000 pound trailer loads.
e Assumes two 20,000 and one 30,000 pound trailer loads. Id. at 152.
4Ibid.47 1d. at p. 156.
481d. at 158.
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high value goods would be taken from trucks. For instance, over
ninety per cent of common carrier truck ton miles and over fifty-one
per cent of private and exempt truck ton miles occur in hauls of
over 200 miles, a distance at which the railroads have a decided cost
advantage." These figures take on added significance from the fact
that the shippers who utilize this service are informed industrial
enterprises that are eager to minimize expenses.
The perpetuation of the value-of-service method of rate making
stems from difficulties in measuring costs in railroad operations, the
policy of choosing the low cost carrier on the basis of fully distri-
buted cost, and the Commission's failure to appreciate fully the
changed environment in the transportation industry. The first two
explanations represent very real problems. On the other hand, the
Commission's refusal to adjust to technological development, e.g.,
the ascent of the motor carrier, appears inexcusable. A more rational
allocation of transportation resources could be obtained by permitting
railroads to lower prices.
C. Abandonments
There are general indications that railroads, if allowed to do so,
would abandon much of their trackage as unproductive. While
several restrictions on an abandonment program would be necessary,"'
many such moves might produce an overall net economic gain. For
example, abandonment of rail passenger service might put bus opera-
tions on a paying basis. The substitution of piggyback operations for
spur lines could provide excellent service to the shipper at a lower
cost to the railroad. Where abandonment is complete, innocent parties
would be left without rail service. Nevertheless, if abandonment is
proper economic policy, it should not be postponed indefinitely. The
availability of substitutes for rail service and the use of phasing out
plans makes abandonment feasible in many cases.
D. Summary
Under the present regulatory scheme, the railroads often are forced,
though sometimes they choose, to deviate from policies which would
result in higher profits and in savings from increased efficiency. The
critical financial condition of many railroads indicates that funda-
mental changes in regulatory policy may be necessary, but it is
'lid. at 194-95.
" Such restrictions would be as follows. (1) Users of an unproductive line must not
be willing to bear the additional expense of making the line productive. (2) If the intro-
duction of new technology would put the line on a paying basis, abandonment would be
restricted. (3) In places in which industrial development indicates that the market will
become a profitable one, abandonment should not occur. Id. at 252-53.
[Vol. 18
COMMENTS
essential that these policy revisions be directed at the disease rather
than at its symptoms. One source of the railroads' problems is the
regulatory legislation under which they operate. The problems are
aggravated by the Commission's failure to take the initiative in
proposing reform. Specifically, a more liberal abandonment policy
would allow the railroads to reduce fixed costs by scrapping ineffi-
cient capital equipment. Rates for profitable routes no longer would
have to include an element of subsidy for unprofitable routes; thus,
one element of non-cost pricing would be removed. Acceptance of
a system of rates based upon cost would contribute to proper alloca-
tion of transportation resources. Downward shifts in rates for high
value commodities is justified easily. First, on an average total cost
basis, railroads are often the cheaper form of transportation. For
instance, thirty-seven per cent more revenue ton-miles can be handled
by rail than by truck at identical cost. 1 Second, because of the down-
ward shift, the trucking industry would be forced to devote more of
its resources to shorter hauls, where it appears to be the "low cost"
carrier. On the other hand, a cost approach to rate setting would
result in the railroads' loss of much of their traffic in bulk commodi-
ties to barges and pipelines which can provide the same service at
lower cost. Where these forms of competition are not present, rates
based on cost could prove prohibitive for the shipper. 2 In this situa-
tion some discrimination would have to be preserved to allow move-
ment of these goods by railroad.
In the absence of such reforms the railroads have turned to merger
to strengthen their financial base. Generally, proponents of merger
claim that material contributions will be made in returning railroads
to profitable operation. In each case, the specific objectives of merger
(e.g., a more efficient operation between Dallas and Houston due to
consolidation of dual and unproductive facilities) should be examined
by the ICC to determine whether these objectives best can be achieved
by merger or whether merger will produce the desired results merely
because it is the best practical alternative under an outmoded regula-
tory system that prevents direct adjustments. The soundness of such
a "practical" or indirect approach to railroad problems also should
be examined to ascertain whether it actually solves the problems to
which it is directed.
51id. at 165.
" Notice that in such areas rail mergers may have the effect of reducing what is
essentially a duopoly or oligopoly to a monopoly, i.e., one railroad company being the
only form of transportation available to shippers. Such a situation undoubtedly would create
a tendency toward more pervasive regulation as well as increase the importance of the
ICC's role as a watchdog.
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III. THE RATIONALE OF MERGER-ARGUMENT FOR
Today, there exists an unparalleled harmony between the industry
and government in an acceptance of the government's long stand-
ing policy favoring rail consolidations. The records of official debate
concerning the railroads are replete with statements supporting con-
solidation programs, many of which favor compulsory consolida-
tions;53 and Congress has acted three times to promote consolidations.
The most recent semi-official policy statement on railroad mergers
may be found in the Doyle Report:
The first consideration of national policy should be to remove the legis-
lative obstacles so far as possible and at the earliest possible moment.
Such concepts as "preserving competition as far as possible" or "avoid-
ing a substantial lessening of competition" and the "preservation of
existing trade routes" must be abandoned in light of the intensive
competition of other modes and a national need for revamping the
traffic flow along direct main routes."4
The industry's approach to merger seems to be presented fairly by
James M. Symes, Chairman of the Pennsylvania Railroad: "If some-
one asked me what I consider the most important single thing the
railroads can do to get the industry back up to its healthy and vigor-
ous status of 30 years ago and ready to take a progressive place in
the transportation of tomorrow you have been talking about, I would
answer in one word-mergers.""
Those who favor merger divide their argument into four cate-
gories: (1) cost reduction, (2) service improvement, (3) optimum
utilization for the national defense, and (4) reduction of difficulties
in regulation. A fifth category comprising answers to those opposing
merger is included in this analysis.
A. Cost Reduction
Railroads seeking merger consistently have listed the reduction of
cost as one of the primary motives.5 Gilbert Burck estimated potential
" Staff of Senate Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 87th Cong., 1st Sess.,
Preliminary Draft of Report on National Transportation Policy 229-72 (Comm. Print
1961) [Doyle Report].
"4Doyle Report, op. cit. supra note 53, at 267.
"Doyle Report, op. cit. supra note 53, at 229. Remarks at Southern Research Institute
Conference on Tomorrow's Transportation, Birmingham, Alabama, Sept. 30, 1960.
" Indeed, the magnitude of the estimated savings is astounding.
Companies Estimated Savings
per year
Mobile & Ohio-Gulf, Mobile & Northern $700,000
Louisville & Nashville-Nashville,
Chattanooga & St. Louis $3.5 million
Norfolk & Western-Virginian $12 millions (before tax)
(Continued on page 453)
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savings of one billion dollars annually if the railroads were unified
in four regional systems, 7 although he admitted these savings could
not be attained in the early years following combination. The
efficiency of the resultant entity may depend on the type of merger
pursued. For instance, unification of parallel and competing lines
may offer an opportunity to reduce expenses radically by destruc-
tion of dual trackage and facilities such as repair shops and terminals.
On the other hand, the potential savings in an end to end type con-
solidation may come from the ability to provide through service."R
The savings with respect to operating expenses could be achieved
by (a) reduction of interchange of locomotives and cars at major
terminal areas, allowing better use of power and crews and maxi-
mizing the mileage between service stops; (b) modernization of
joint classification yards, reducing the large cost of this operation;
(c) making up through trains which can use the most efficient route;
(d) introduction of one way tracks where parallel lines now exist;
(e) simplification and centralization of car repairs, resulting in fewer
cars returning home for repair and a decrease in the cars necessary
for operations; (f) consolidation of schedules to achieve adequate
service with a minimum number of cars; and (g) standardization
of signals, ruling grades, and operating rules.
Although the savings to be obtained through unified management
are not as large as those in operating expenses, they are more certain:
(a) the number of employees involved in traffic solicitation, adver-
tising, public relations, and accounting would be reduced; (b) many
offices could be abandoned; (c) computers would perform much
work now duplicated; (d) cars would be purchased on a volume
basis; and (e) management could be decreased.
The financial advantages are: (a) consolidation of terminal facili-
ties and dual trackage enabling a reduction in real estate investment
and the taxes imposed thereon, and (b) more adequate long range





Atlantic Coast Line & Charleston-
Western Carolina $300,000
Erie-Delaware, Lackawanna & Western $13.5 million
Hearings on Rail Merger Legislation Before the Senate Subcommittee on
Antitrust and Monopoly, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 893-98 (1962).5
7Burck, A Plan to Save the Railroads, Fortune, Aug. 1958, p. 82.
" The type merger involved is an important determinant of the extent to which
competition will be destroyed. In mergers of parallel competing carriers, the saving is





Railroad freight service has deteriorated in recent years both in
frequency of service and dependability of delivery. Timely delivery
is made virtually impossible because of long delays in interchanging
cars. Efforts to economize by operating fewer, but longer, trains have
resulted in crowding at intermediate and terminal yards, often not
equipped to handle the situation. Because many companies may
handle a particular shipment, the initial railroad is unable to guar-
antee delivery time. The evils attending the division of responsi-
bility if several railroads handle a single shipment would perish in
an extensive consolidation program. Service and delivery time could
be guaranteed. More frequent service between major areas would be
provided in economically sized trains. Greater speed in long-haul
service would be possible. Branch and feeder lines could be geared
into fast main-line schedules. The better service provided in a con-
solidated system would enable railroads to reclaim lost profits by
competing more effectively with trucks. Less-than-carload business
would be more profitable under a unified system. And finally, piggy-
back operations should prosper with the general service improvement.
C. National Defense
In the event of war, it would be necessary to mobilize the rail-
roads into a working unit with a minimum of time. This could be
accomplished more easily with fewer firms.
D. Reduction Of Difficulties In Regulation
Consolidations might transform the almost impossible job of regu-
lating over 500 railroads into a very reasonable task. Less administra-
tion of routing regulations and the division of rates along with the
reduction of tariffs to be approved would lift burdens from the
Commission. Also, the volume of litigation would decrease.
E. An Answer To The Critics
Those who decry railroad consolidations on the ground that com-
petition would be destroyed are mistaken in two respects. First,
effective intraindustry competition does not exist. The railroads are
notorious for their friendliness toward collective action. " Rate corn-
59 In 1947, Robert R. Young, President of the C. & 0., spoke out against William T.
Faricy, President of the Association of American Railroads as follows:
Mr. Faricy argues that if the roads did not practice deliberate slowdowns so
that each road has the same schedule, they might have to run shorter trains
and more of them. . . . Mr. Faricy would deplore having what he calls freight
"speed wars" (on trains now averaging 20 miles per hour)-just as a little
while ago some of the roads deplored "quality wars" when they voted to
suppress air conditioning. What is wrong with "quality wars" and "service
wars"? Railway Age, Aug. 23, 1947, p. 335.
(Vol. -18
COMMENTS
petition is all but prohibited because of the bureaus. Service improve-
ments are rare;"0 when forthcoming, they are the product of collec-
tive action, not of intraindustry competition.' Innovation seldom
is profitable in the railroad industry because of the requirement of
standardized equipment."2 Second, the reasons for past concern over
preserving competition have vanished. Although it is true that some
towns would be served by only one railroad, effective interindustry
competition is so intense that the public would be protected. " Com-
petition through piggyback services from small towns into large cen-
ters would constitute additional protection. Actually, fierce interin-
dustry competition keeps management on its toes and calls forth
efficient service." Finally, in the areas in which true monopoly con-
ditions exist (e.g., bulk commodities), the Commission is empowered
to protect the public interest.
IV. THE ARGUMENT AGAINST MERGER
The arguments against a general policy favoring railroad consoli-
dations are almost as varied as the sources from which they come.
It is not uncommon to find labor unions, cities, states, other rail-
roads, non-profit organizations, and the Department of Justice all
opposing a merger because of legitimate interests each has. The
arguments range from a fear of financial giants, to belief in a com-
petitive railroad system, to doubts of the functional efficiency of
large systems.
A. Economies Of Density And Scale"'
Many of the hopes of solving the financial problems of railroads
through mergers are based on the notion that economies can be
O""We haven't improved the service enough in the last 40 years to stick in your eye."
McGinnis, Radical Cures for Railroad Ills, Commercial and Financial Chronicle, Nov. 7,
1957, p. 2013.
"1 Conant, Railroad Consolidations and the Antitrust Laws, 14 Stan. L. Rev. 489, 492
(1962).
62 Ibid.
'3"In view of the virtually overwhelming competition the railroad finds for the pre-
ponderance of its valuable traffic, the adherence to this bias [intraindustry competition] is
most unjustified and is not in line with a proper conception of public interest." Doyle
Report, op. cit. supra note 55, at 260. "With the growth of alternative modes of trans-
portation, intramodal competition between railroads should become less important and
the idea of railroad monopolies at many service points will be no longer repugnant."
Tucker, The Public Interest in Railroad Mergers, 29 ICC Prac. J. 342, 347-48 (1961).
"The introduction of more powerful engines which provide faster freight trains and
the design for specialized types of freight cars were the result of motor truck rivalry.
Barriger, Super Railroads to Meet Post-War Rivalry, Railway Age, Oct. 18, 1941, p. 610.
Lighter, streamlined passenger trains were the result of airline and bus rivalry. Kelly,
Re-Making Transport Package, Railway Age, Feb. 17, 1940, p. 330.
6" The conclusions suggested under this heading are drawn from Healy, The Effects of
Scale in the Railroad Industry (1961) and Healy, The Merger Movement in Transportation,
Am. Econ. Rev., May, 1962, p. 436.
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achieved by eliminating parallel trackage and terminal facilities. The
rationale is that the density of traffic over one line would increase
substantially, thereby reducing the cost of providing service over that
line. Professor Healy discovered that in some cases economies in fact
can be achieved by mergers of parallel lines. Once annual revenue
per mile of road reaches 50,000 dollars, however, the ability to pro-
duce savings through merger appears very doubtful. Professor Healy
could find no relation between density and any measure of perform-
ance for the large Eastern roads whose revenues generally are above
this level."6
Quite another matter is the optimal size at which a railroad can
operate. Here, Professor Healy found that economies of scale can be
achieved in a railroad with up to 5,000 employees; diseconomies of
scale set in at above 10,000 employees. 7 Comparisons of companies
which have 80,000 employees with those having 10,000 suggest that
the return on capital for the latter is at least three percentage points
higher, more than double that of the larger companies. " (These con-
clusions take into account the effect of traffic density.) There are
several explanations for this behavior. First, larger companies are not
able to increase the size of their operating units. Merged companies
would use the same centralized traffic control, locomotives, passenger
and freight cars that they now do. Second, smaller lines attract busi-
ness because of better communication, faster response, and the under-
standings they are able to reach with shippers. Friction, inertia, and
lack of individual initiative are characteristic of the larger firms and
cannot be located as easily as they might in a manufacturing enter-
prise where quality control over products serves as a test. The combi-
nation of poor morale and inability to check on employees is sig-
nificant because in the railroad industry wages usually are equal to
fifty per cent of revenue.
B. A Competitive Rail System
With the advent of intense competition from water carriers in the
shipping of bulk commodities and from trucks in the shipping of
"
6Healy, The Effects of Scale in the Railroad Industry 3 (1961). The Pennsylvania,
New York Central, and Baltimore & Ohio are already well over the 50,000 dollar annual
revenue per mile figure.
67 Id. at 8. The large Eastern roads each employ more than 10,000.
Company Number of Employees
Pennsylvania 103,000
New York Central 82,000
Baltimore & Ohio 46,000
Seaboard Air Line 15,000
Atlantic Coast Line 19,000
68Id, at 3. Compare Table 1 (railroads ranked by number of employees) and Table 7
(railroads ranked by return on capital). Id. at 8, 37.
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high value goods, it is argued that interindustry competition comple-
mented by Commission supervision would be sufficient to protect the
public interest. Reliance upon this form of competition, however,
involves several assumptions. First, the various transportation indus-
tries have different cost characteristics which provide each with cer-
tain sheltered markets." In such circumstances the threat of ICC
action would be the only force which could be relied upon to protect
the public interest. Second, many markets are not served by other
modes which are effective substitutes for railroads. This would be
particularly true in bulk commodity items in areas where water trans-
proation is not available. Again the only solution would appear to be
reliance on the regulatory body to insure "good service at reasonable
rates."
Such a solution is hardly consistent with the approach outlined
by President Kennedy in a statement to Congress: "It [adequate
transportation at the lowest possible cost] means greater reliance on
the forces of competition and less reliance on the restraints of regu-
lation.""° Neither is such an approach in harmony with what shippers
consider protection. The Department of Justice listed the following
examples in its brief in the Atlantic Coast Line-Seaboard Airline
merger:
Thus, the Dixie Plywood Company of Tampa stresses the importance of
alternate rail service. Its representative testified that competition makes
for better service, pointing out, for example, that a railroad is more
apt to abide by its schedules if there is competing rail service.
Similarly, the traffic manager of Burnett Bros. of Tampa testified
that competitive rail service means better and faster service.
The St. Regis Paper Company vigorously opposed the merger, point-
ing out the various ways in which a competitive rail service, such as is
now provided by the SAL-ACL, results in a more adequate transporta-
tion system. In fact, it is the company's policy in selecting a site for
a major mill to choose a location served by more than one railroad,
because its experience at three major plants where it is served by a
single railroad has been that the rail service is considerably inferior to
6' Even if interindustry competition were sufficient to protect all the public
interests, intraindustry competition has certain unique characteristics. It is
only in competition between firms in the same industry that each competitor
has similar cost structures and products, so that each can come close to
duplicating a rival's prices and services. In contrast, interindustry competition
must always be limited, for the differences in cost structure from one industry
to another provides sheltered markets in which one industry has an inherent
advantage over all rivals. For this reason, competition within an industry is
considered necessary in both the literature and economics and the interpreta-
tions of the antitrust laws in order to provide the competitive pressures neces-
sary to fully promote efficiency, progress, and lower prices. Meyer, op. cit.
supra note 39, at 240-41.
"0Message from the President of the United States Relative to The Transportation
System of Our Nation, H.R. Doc. No. 384, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1962).
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that at its plants where there is competitive rail service. . . . [T]he
elimination of this two line service could severely jeopardize the opera-
tions and adversely affect the company, its employees, and the general
public."
The President of Virginia Carolina Chemical Corporation, a fertilizer
company, testified that: "For a number of years, the company's
mines were served by only one railroad, but since joint service has
been available, service has improved, and the carriers have been very
cooperative. It has been possible under two line service to obtain
better equipment, better switching service, and better car supply.""
Mr. Stan Thomas, General Solicitor of the Atchison, Topeka, &
Santa Fe, in a speech before the Southeastern Association of Railroad
and Utilities Commissioners, noted that "regulation alone cannot
insure the aggressive and continuing development of the transporta-
tion service which is essential to our economy."'" He added further:
There are real advantages to the public from competition between rail-
roads. Aggressive competition between individual railroads has a direct
relation to the pricing of service generally, to rate innovations, to the
faster improvement of service, to the furnishing of equipment, to the
provision of accessorial services-to name only a few items. This is
evidenced by the general preference of shippers to locate plants where
they can be served by more than one railroad.
Such competition has also furthered the efforts of the railroads to
meet the competition of other forms of transportation. For instance,
if one railroad decides the best way to meet competition is to install
piggyback service with reduced rates between two points, other rail-
roads must go along if they want to remain competitive. In this and
in many other ways, the initiative of many individual railroads pro-
duces developments which might not otherwise have taken place as
quickly or perhaps not at all.'"
C. Other Objections On The Merits
Other objections not discussed here are the increased power merged
companies would have in the Association of American Railroads, the
loss of jobs for union members, the injurious effect on community
growth, the possible abuse of power in control situations, possible
abuses in the securities markets, and the risk of financial ruin leading
to nationalization of the railroads.
D. Soundness Of The Railroads' Approach To Merger
Although none of the foregoing objections relate to mergers of
" Railway Labor Executives' Association, Railroad Merger Mania: Its Causes and Cure
107 (1962).
"2 Id. at 108.




smaller companies, particularly those in need of financial assistance.
the soundness of the entire merger movement may be questioned
because of the approach taken by the railroads. One example, which
certainly is not atypical, should suffice.7" In 1956, James Symes, now
chairman of the Pennsylvania, approached Young and Perlman of
the New York Central with a proposal for a gigantic merger. The
Central stated that it did not believe such a huge system would be
in the public interest, but agreed to study the suggestion. The studies
indicated annual savings of one hundred million dollars, but the New
York Central avoided any direct move toward consolidation. Instead,
it referred the matter to the Eastern Railroad Presidents' Conference
for consideration of the feasibility of creating three or four balanced
systems in the East. When nothing came of this, Perlman of the New
York Central proposed a three way merger to the Pennsylvania and
the Chesapeake & Ohio. Touchy of the Chesapeake & Ohio felt that
his railroad could not maintain its four dollar dividend payments or
its financial strength in a merger with both roads, and suggested that
the Chesapeake & Ohio unite with the Baltimore & Ohio before
entering the proposed merger. Such a move, however, would have
left the New York Central holding the bag. The Pennsylvania with
its affiliated roads and the B & O-C & 0 would have comprised two
large eastern systems which could have damaged the New York Cen-
tral. Specifically, the New York Central depended on the C & 0 for
coal traffic which probably would have been diverted to the B & 0.
When proposals that the ICC investigate the entire merger situation
failed (delay tactics), in self defense the Central attempted to better
the C & 0 offer to the B & 0. A wild affray erupted to enlist the
support of the B & 0 shareholders, which the C & 0 interests even-
tually won. The highlight of the campaign was an attempt by each
company to enlist the support of Swiss bankers who held over twenty
per cent of the B & 0 shares. The Central later attempted to block
the B & O-C & 0 union in the ICC, but was forced to withdraw in
self defense because in the meantime it had opened negotiations with
the Pennsylvania, and Central did not wish to be placed in the
anomalous position of opposing merger one day and proposing it the
next.
The truth is that merger begets merger. Once the movement
begins, companies are forced to look for suitable merger prospects.
Otherwise, they may find their traffic diverted to other roads or they
may be squeezed into a merger at an unfavorable exchange rate.




Because of the size of the companies involved, ill-considered mergers
could have serious effects. More penetrating regulations, perhaps to
compel favorable realignment, would be necessary. And, of course,
the failure of the eastern mergers could lead to nationalization of the
railroads.
Under the present regulatory scheme the ICC does not take the
initiative in proposing mergers."0 The Commission does have the
power to determine its own procedure,7 however, and consideration
of the cases on a regional basis would seem preferable since the Com-
mission appears willing to allow consolidation. This method would
insure that the same criteria would be used to test all merger applica-
tions and would prevent the Commission from being compelled to
approve later mergers because of the situation created by earlier
approvals. Finally, the Commission has the power to institute an
inquiry on its own motion,7' a power that could be used to investigate
the merger proposals generally.
V. SPECIFIC CASES
The focus of this Comment heretofore has been general, its pur-
pose to picture the railroad industry in its regulatory scheme and to
etch the framework within which the Commission considers merger
applications. Two recent merger decisions will now be placed within
that framework and examined to determine the role antitrust legisla-
tion plays in the application of the National Transportation Policy
to mergers. In December of 1962, the ICC approved the Chesapeake
& Ohio Railway's purchase of control in the Baltimore & Ohio Rail-
road."9 One year later the Seaboard Air Line Railroad-Atlantic Coast
Line Railroad merger was approved." The C & O-B & 0 union com-
bined firms with assets valued at over two billion dollars, and the Sea-
board-Atlantic Coast merger produced a new company with over one
billion dollars in assets. These decisions are important not only as iso-
lated cases, but as precedents which will control in the multitude of
merger proposals now scheduled for hearing in the ICC."
"'St. Joe Paper Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 347 U.S. 298, 305-06 (1954).
77 54 Stat. 913 (1940), 49 U.S.C. § 17(3) (1958) permits the Commission to deter-
mine its own procedure under any provision of law in such manner as best will promote
the proper dispatch of business and the ends of justice.
7154 Stat. 910 (1940), 49 U.S.C. § 13(2) (1958).
"Chesapeake & 0. Ry.-Control-Baltimore & O.R.R., 317 I.C.C. 261 (1962),
aff'd sub noa. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees v. United States, 221 F.
Supp. 19 (E.D. Mich. 1963).
" Seaboard Air Line RR.-Control-Atlantic Coast Line R.R., - I.C.C. -, Finance
Docket No. 21215 (Dec. 2, 1963).
" In the narrow and literal sense, the transaction proposed was the control of
the B & 0 by the C & 0. What these parties actually propose, however,
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A. The C & O-B F 0
The C & O-B & 0 combination was characterized by the majority
opinion as an alliance of a "weak" and a "strong" road. The B & O's
net income had decreased steadily from a profit of twenty-four
million dollars in 1957 to a deficit of thirty-one million dollars in
1961. Because of its financial deterioration, the normal overall main-
tenance program had been neglected. In addition, its car fleet had
become seriously inadequate. The C & 0 had the financial strength
to aid the B & 0 and had completed a study of B & O's weakness
which resulted from the C & O's proposal to help its affiliate with
a five-year program directed at the modernization of its entire plant.2
The majority held that "a complete rehabilitation program must be
completed to reduce maintenance expenses" 3 and that "unless main-
tenance expenses are reduced, B & 0 will be in no position to increase
its earnings." 4 The Commission's conclusion that "the record clearly
reflects the complete inability of B & 0 by itself to improve its
financial position '""5 actually sealed the case. The C & 0 rehabilitation
plan, which will cost 232 million dollars over the next five years,
eventually will net the parties estimated savings of forty-five million
dollars as well as make the B & 0 a stronger carrier. The Commis-
sion concluded by noting that because the carriers were generally
complementary, there would be no material lessening of competition
and the transaction would assist in effectuating the overall trans-
portation policy.
Although the C & O-B & 0 case is important in several respects,88
this analysis is devoted exclusively to the antitrust issues presented.
is to become one of three giant rail systems in the East. The proposed three-
rail system in the East, together with merger negotiations and proposals
involving other regions, presents one fundamental issue: What kind of rail-
road system should the present generation leave to the generations that
follow? Chesapeake & 0. Ry.--Control-Baltimore & O.R.R., 317 I.C.C.
261, 298, aff'd sub nom. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees v.
United States, 221 F. Supp. 19 (E.D. Mich. 1963).
" A five-year program of building and repairing freight cars; improving freight yards
and tunnel clearance; modernization of coal and ore handling facilities; installation of
traffic control systems; and improvements to track and bridge structures, roadway
machinery, and system servicing facilities was proposed. Id. at 275.
13 1d. at 278.
84 Ibid.
" Id. at 279. In addition to the above mentioned problems of B & 0 was the fact that
current liabilities exceeded current assets by 24.9 million dollars. A 15 million dollar
bank note due in May, 1962, had been extended only to the end of 1967, and the B & 0
had practically no unencumbered assets to offer as security for long term loans. Ibid.
8" First, the decision rejected the suggestion that all of the merger cases for the eastern
region be consolidated for hearing to prevent the initial cases from prejudicing those still
pending. Second, it authorized the union of two companies with assets totaling over 2
billion dollars, which apparently sets the stage for large scale consolidation in the East.
Third, the approach involved indicates the Commission's willingness to rely on regulation
by the agency as opposed to reliance on competition.
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It is noteworthy that neither the majority opinion nor the dissent
devoted more than one page to antitrust issues as such. The explana-
tion is that the C & 0 and the B & 0 cannot fairly be called com-
petitors. Further, the antitrust issues are hidden under the cloak
of diversion of traffic from other roads. For instance, the New York
Central depends on the C & 0 for a substantial amount of coal
traffic. Since the Central is competitive with the B & 0, Central
reasonably feared that the C & 0 would divert traffic then going to
the Central to the B & 0, its new subsidiary. The majority avoided
this issue by accepting the C & O-B & 0 estimates of traffic diver-
sion, which indicated that of the 66,485 cars interchangeable with
the Central, only 2,192 or about three per cent would be diverted.
The dissent accepted the Central estimate that forty-one per cent of
its traffic would be diverted, enough to cause eventual financial ruin.
Although it is impossible to tell which estimate is correct, it is
certain that some parts of the market now open to the Central will
be foreclosed. The B & 0 serves forty and the Central thirty-nine of
the forty-three major cities to be served by the C & O-B & 0 system.
In cases where the C & 0 presently routes traffic to these cities on
either the B & 0 or the Central, it is reasonable to expect that com-
petition will end. This conclusion is buttressed by the nonexistence
of rate competition in these areas. The initial blow to the Central's
revenue may have long range effects (the majority said no, the dissent
yes), such as depriving the Central of funds necessary to maintain
facilities. On the other hand, portions of the Central's forty-one
per cent traffic diversion results are based on the supposition that the
B & 0 would attract the Central's business because of better service.
An approach to the competition issue through the antitrust laws
yields an analogy to vertical integration cases under the Clayton
Act. s" For instance, if one of two competitors purchased control of
the only supplier within reasonable shipping distance, the purchasing
market for the other business might be eliminated."8 Such a pur-
chase would be condemned under the Clayton Act. On the other
hand, the antitrust laws generally are not violated by vigorous com-
petition, even though harmful to other businesses. The distinction
drawn by the antitrust laws is important because it aims at achieving
a rational allocation of resources.
1738 Stat. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 12-27 (1958).
88 This hypothetical situation assumes that the supplier can continue to dispose of a
large percentage of its output to companies not competitive with its parent.
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B. Seaboard Air Line Railroad Company-Merger-Atlantic
Coast Line Railroad Company
Unlike the C & O-B & 0 combination, the proposal in this case
concerned the merger of two profitable roads whose lines were
parallel and competing. During the years 1955 to 1962, Seaboard's
annual net income averaged 16.4 million dollars. In 1961, Seaboard
earned a net income of 14.6 million dollars, representing a return
of 3.84 per cent on the depreciated value of property used in trans-
portation operations, plus cash and the cost of materials and sup-
plies.8' The Company's net income for 1962 was 18.1 million dollars
and the corresponding return was 4.65 per cent.9" The average net
income for Atlantic Coast during the same eight-year period up to
1962 was 11.3 million dollars. 1 Net income for 1961 was 10.8 million
dollars, a return of 2.39 per cent, but in 1962 the Company earned
16.1 million dollars, increasing its return to 3.52 per cent." The
Commission concluded that "both Seaboard and Coast Line have
enjoyed a moderate degree of prosperity over the past several years
and each railroad is currently in a relatively healthy condition." 9
The Commission dealt with the competition issue by specifically
holding that "the reduction of rail competition caused by the pro-
posed merger will not be substantial. . . ."" However, implicit in the
foregoing statement is that some competition would be forfeited and
the opinion so held. The applicants served 121 common points over
a six-state area. The merged company had over fifty-four per cent
of the total rail mileage in this area, while the Southern Railway, its
nearest competitor, had about thirty-four per cent. In Florida, the
new Company owned approximately eighty-one per cent of the rail
mileage. The effect of the consolidation was to end competition be-
tween the two on one-third of their combined total tonnage, but over
half of this amount remained competitive with other railroads. 5 The
areas in which the merger created a monopoly comprised only fifteen
per cent of the retail business and ten per cent of the wholesale busi-
89 Seaboard Air Line R.R.-Control-Atlantic Coast Line R.R., - I.C.C. _ Finance
Docket No. 21215, App. VIII (Dec. 2, 1963).
9' Id. at 35. See also Id. App. VIII.
91 Id. at 36. See also Id. App. IX.
'a Ibid.
3 rd. at 36.
4Id. at 62.
" [O]f a total freight traffic of 1,859,863,046 hundred pounds, 620,757,508
hundred pounds, or 33.4 percent of their total tonnage was competitive be-
tween the applicants, Of the total Seaboard-Coast Line competitive traffic,
366,060,076 hundred pounds or 19.7 percent of their total tonnage would
remain competitive with other railroads after the merger, and rail competi-
tion would be eliminated after the merger on 254,697,432 hundred pounds,
or about 13.7 percent of their combined total freight tonnage. Id. at 56.
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ness. The average population of cities outside of Florida deprived of
competitive rail service was only 6,500, and every city with a popu-
lation in excess of 200,000, except Tampa, was still served by at
least two roads.
On the issue of competition, the Commission characterized its
task as one of accommodating section 5" and the antitrust laws. 7
What actually occurred is more accurately expressed by the Com-
mission as follows: "Our primary task is to reconcile the objective
of 'preventing injurious waste and in securing more efficient trans-
portation service' . . . with the general concern of Congress 'that
tendencies toward concentration in industry are to be curbed in their
incipiency . . . .' "" One fundamental issue is presented: "Are the
antitrust laws and the decisions which give them meaning a specific
consideration in merger deliberations before the ICC?" The policy
implications in the answer to this question are immense. This was the
first merger proposal to face the Commission in which both com-
panies had prospered under competition. The decision in this case
should determine to some extent the future of the railroad industry
in the United States. Thus, there was a pressing need for a compre-
hensive definition of the role competition is to play as an element in
the National Transportation Policy.
Unfortunately, the Commission answered the question in the nega-
tive by default. First, the phrase "consistent with the public interest"
was interpreted to mean not contradictory or hostile to the public
interest."9 Notwithstanding prior decisions, it is submitted that some-
thing more is required in this case and the many other railroad merger
proposals which will follow. This decision forfeited competition on
traffic which yielded revenues of 130 million dollars annually. Cer-
tainly, even under a vague notion of Congressional concern for the
preservation of competition, substantial benefits are needed to justify
such action. The justification for the decision lay essentially in the esti-
mated twenty million dollars annual savings before taxes.' ° The Com-
"See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
9' Seaboard Air Line R.R.-Control-Atlantic Coast Line R.R., - I.C.C. __, Finance
Docket No. 21215, at 113 (Dec. 2, 1963).
" Id. at 9. (Emphasis added.)
" Id. at 10. Patently, this statement is meaningless as a legal proposition because it
ignores definition of the crucial term "public interest." It is significant, however, because
it indicates the attitude of the Commission toward merger proposals.
"o The net saving before taxes as a result of the merger was estimated by the appli-
cants to be over 38 million dollars annually. This cost reduction was to be achieved by
abandoning track; abolishing jobs; eliminating duplicate passenger service; pooling equip-
ment; consolidating stations, terminals, and offices for management; and abandoning un-
necessary repair shops. Id. App. X. The Commission estimated savable expenses to be a
minimum of 20 million dollars before taxes, thus setting the stage for a holding that the
merger would assist in "the avoidance of injurious waste and the development of a more
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mission held that "it is axiomatic that the elimination of wasteful
and unnecessary facilities and services will eventually redound to
the public generally.' ' .1 However, this axiom begs the essential ques-
tion for it assumes that regulation can be so effective that the need
for competition is lessened substantially. If this correctly states the
approach or the attitude of the Commission, and it was characterized
as such by the dissent,"2 then one might predict the eventual con-
solidation of the railroads into a few regional monopolies. Two addi-
tional facts lend support to this possibility. First, the Commission re-
tained jurisdiction of the merger for five years to allow the "weak
lines" (which are also the smaller lines) to petition to be included in
the transaction. These weak lines include some of the same lines which
opposed the merger on the ground of traffic diversion. Second, the
majority drew what the dissent termed an "anomalous analogy" be-
tween railroads and utilities (gas, electric, telephone). The majority
opinion noted that "a single company frequently serves large metro-
politan areas and often even significantly larger geographic or market
areas"; that "under regulation, their services, as a general rule, are
efficient and reasonably priced despite absences of competition"; and
finally that eas railroads have the basic economic characteristics of
public utilities and are subject to regulation in the public interest at
both the federal and state levels, it is not realistic to insist that intra-
modal rail competition must be preserved at all places, at all times
and under all circumstances......
The Seaboard decision held that the proposed merger would not
substantially reduce rail competition. Yet the decision devoted con-
siderable energy to prove the proposition that: "With the develop-
ment of intense competition in recent years from other modes of
transport, the preservation of intramodal rail competition has lost
much of its significance in the furtherance of the overall national
efficient transportation system"; Id. at 112, and therefore would be consistent with the
national transportation policy. Actually, the holding considered all of the criteria in 54
Stat. 905 (1940), 49 U.S.C. § 5(2)(c), and made specific holdings with respect to pro-
tection of the employees involved, as required by 54 Stat. 905 (1940), 49 U.S.C. § 5(2) (f),
and for inclusion of other "weak" roads in the merger if they so desire during the next
5 years in which the Commission will retain jurisdiction. Id. at 113.
101 Id. at 114.
102 The report exaggerates the efficacy of regulation. Regulation, in my opinion,
would collapse of its own weight if it were not for the existence of substantial
competition. It is competition, not the Interstate Commerce Commission,
which is the prime regulator of railroad rates and charges and the principal
deterrent to discriminatory practices. In any event the Commission's excessive
reliance on regulation flies in the teeth of the policy expressed by the Supreme
Court in United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank. . . . Id. at 137-38.
(Emphasis added.)
103 Id. at 61. (Emphasis added.) Notice the extreme conflict with the position taken
by Professor Healy with respect to economies of scale in railroads. See note 65-68 supra
and accompanying text.
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transportation policy."'' 4 The decision actually attempted to "cover"
the transportation service market in both its broad and narrow
aspects. But the Commission never designated the relevant service
market to be either rail transportation service or transportation serv-
ice generally. With respect to the entire transportation industry, the
Commission made several general findings about the development of
modes other than railroads in the six-state area, 0 ' then in two sen-
tences made its essential holding:
Additionally, motor carriers are increasing their long haul business
and are capable of handling practically any type commodity. For ex-
ample, in 1958, long haul movements by truck in excess of 100 miles
constituted, in various sections of the applicants' territory, more than
19% of the total of such movements in the case of fertilizers, 30%
of building materials, 59% of foodstuffs and beverages, 92% of paper
mill products, 82% of cotton and cloth products, 68% of meal and
74% of miscellaneous products."
Certainly this brief statement cannot be interpreted as defining the
relevant service market and the relevant geographical market. Yet
on the basis of the examples offered, the Commission suggested that
truck and rail service are almost perfectly interchangeable. °7 The
facts are contrary."' First, each of the railroads' most important
freight is phosphate rock, which the majority opinion was forced
to characterize as "essentially a commodity normally handled by
"o Seaboard Air Line R.R.-Control-Atlantic Coast Line R.R., - I.C.C. _, Finance
Docket No. 21215, at 60 (Dec. 2, 1963).
105 The Commission noted that between 1948 and 1959 truck registrations increased
from 900,000 to 1,490,000 (66%); truck ton miles increased 147% (compared with
3% for the railroads); passenger miles increased 380% and those on inland waterways by
24% (compared with a 44% decrease for railroads); and that in the transport of crude
petroleum, pipeline carriage had tripled, and truck carriage had increased from 6% to
almost 25%. Id. at 36-39.
16 Id. at 39-40 (Emphasis added.)
'"The majority held that trucks are capable of handling any type commodity. Id.
at 39. The dissent suggested that a "twilight" zone existed in which other modes were not
competitive with the railroads (e.g. heavy-loading, low value bulk and unfinished goods
and various piggyback plans) and that it constituted a submarket under the Brown Shoe
doctrine. Id. at 145. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
s The nine major commodities, in terms of tonnage handled by the two roads, are
as follows:
Seaboard Coast Line
Phosphate Rock Phosphate Rock
Stone and Rock Stone and Rock
Pulpwood Pulpwood
Bituminous Coal Bituminous Coal
Gravel and Sand Gravel and Sand
Fertilizers, NOS Fertilizers, NOS
Cement: natural and portland Cement: natural and portland
Paperboard, Fiberboard and
Pulpwood Paperboard, Fiberboard, and Pulpwood
Bentonite Products of Agriculture, NOS
Seaboard Air Line R.R.-Control-Atlantic Coast Line R.R., - I.C.C.
Finance Docket No. 21215, at 150 (Dec. 2, 1963) (dissenting opinion).
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rail.'... Most of the other products which are significant were not
specifically mentioned. The categories which were itemized might be
broad enough to include some of the various products (i.e., building
materials might include stone and rock or paperboard, fiberboard,
and pulpwood), but the Commission did not venture an estimate
of the extent to which this was true. Fertilizer was the only product
specifically considered which was an important item of carriage to
both roads, but trucks account for only eighteen per cent of that
traffic. The reference to "various sections of the applicant's terri-
tory""11 is too vague to have meaning. Much of the opinion focused
on the six-state area and to some extent on Florida, which may con-
stitute the geographical market in this case. But it is impossible to tell
how much of that territory is encompassed in the area considered by
the Commission.
Although definition of these markets would not be an easy task,"'
the alternative is to make an indecisive holding on the antitrust issue.
The predicted savings then appear very attractive and the path is
reasonably clear for a finding that the merger is "not contradictory
or hostile to the public interest." This amounts to merger by default.
Thus, the Commission's apparent policy to favor concentration
(and the necessary corollary, more extensive regulation) and its
failure to define relevant markets creates a situation in which defini-
tive treatment of the antitrust issues, in terms of the relevant statutes
and case law, only serves to weaken the case for merger. In an effort
to support its "general" approach to the competition issue, the Com-
mission cited the McLean case"' for the authority that the ICC need
not base its conclusion as to whether competition will be materially
lessened on the specific concepts developed in antitrust law. "Thus,
here, the Commission has no power to enforce the Sherman Act as
such. It cannot decide definitively whether the transaction con-
templated constitutes a restraint of trade or an attempt to monopo-
lize which is forbidden by that Act...... This language does not sup-
port the proposition for which it is offered. The conflict in the
McLean case was substantive, involving the weight which should be
'
0 9 Id. at 39.
110 See text accompanying note 106 supra.
III The geographical market might be the six-state area, but ideally the submarkets
would comprise the routes between two points. The service market then would have to be
defined as intramodal or intermodal. If it is intermodal, it must be examined on several
levels with respect to the type product handled. For some of these products in the bulk
commodity class, the traffic would undoubtedly be competitive only among the rails. The
definition of these markets in terms of products would be fantastically complex. Computers
would ease this problem if they can be adapted for this purpose. Otherwise the technique
of sampling which is now used in antitrust cases would be the best solution.
11 McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67 (1944).
"s Id. at 79.
1964]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
placed on the effect on competition of a proposed merger. The issue
presented in the Seaboard case was what method or procedure the
Commission should adopt to properly assess the anticompetitive
effects involved. This issue was not presented in the McLean case.
In that case, there was no disagreement about the method of measur-
ing the effect on competition. Moreover, at that stage in the develop-
ment of the antitrust law, such terms as "the relevant market" were
unknown, and it is improbable that the present controversy over the
technique of determining the effects on competition ever would have
arisen."'
If the Commission is going to consider the anticompetitive effects
at all, then it must do so within some frame of reference which pro-
vides an opportunity for meaningful conclusions. The concepts
developed in antitrust litigation are the only instruments available
for this task and certainly provide more reliable standards than "the
general concern of Congress that tendencies toward consolidation in
industry are to be curbed in their incipiency. '115 If the concepts of
antitrust law are used, then the adverse effects can be weighed
against the potential benefits, and the Commission can balance the
conflicting interests to reach a rational decision. Any other method
of accommodating section 5 and the antitrust laws"' is meaningless
because any conclusion reached on the issue of competition would
have no rational basis.
The statutes". which govern this area do not begin to suggest
the proper role of competition in the transportation industry. The
Commission's duty is to consider the anticompetitive effect, but the
framework or policy within which this issue is to be considered is
completely lacking. To say that the competitive effects must be
weighed against other public benefits is insufficient when the rela-
tive importance of these conflicting goals is uncertain. One possible
answer is that Congress entrusted the development of such a policy
to the Commission. Assuming the validity of such a presumption,
14 Another argument for the specific application of the concepts developed under the
antitrust law exists with respect to the Clayton Act. 38 Stat. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. 55 12-
27 (1958). The Commission has the authority under § 11 of the Clayton Act to en-
force § 7 where applicable. Even the logic used in reaching the conclusion that the
McLean case directs the Commission to apply general standards does not suggest that McLean
foreclosed considerations of the issues in light of the Clayton Act (the McLean opinion refers
specifically only to the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1958)).
However, this argument is only technically valid because the question presented by the
Clayton Act is essentially the same as that presented by the Sherman Act: "Are the anti-
trust laws (and the decisions which give them meaning) the proper standard for assessing
the anticompetitive effects of a proposed merger?"
"'.Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 346 (1962).
110 See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
11 See notes 4-23 supra and accompanying text.
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however, this policy has not been forthcoming. Thus, the reason for
making an accurate estimation of competitive effects disappears be-
cause there is no meaningful framework within which they may be
considered.
The consequences of Congressional failure to provide the ICC with
a precise policy in this area have been twofold. First, it has placed
the entire responsibility for such policy decisions upon the ICC,
which usually avoids having to weigh the conflicting positions by
simply holding that the lessening of competition is not substantial
(e.g., the Seaboard-Coast Line case)."' Second, if the Commission
avoids weighing the various positions, attack on appeal is almost
impossible because of the nebulous way in which the competition
issue has been approached.
Because the companies involved were large and prosperous and
fairly could be called competitors, the Seaboard-Coast Line case
offered an excellent opportunity for the Commission to reveal a
comprehensive and definite policy on the place of competition in
the industry. Instead, the Commission indicated its indifference to
the precise facts which made this merger different from any other
approved to date. The Commission conceded that: "There . . . is
no provision in the act which expressly or by implication prohibits
the merger of financially strong railroads. The act draws no dis-
tinction as between the strong and the weak, or between the com-
petitive and non-competitive railroads.' .... This statement cannot be
challenged in the abstract, but it misses the point, for certainly the
financial health of a railroad is a material factor in determining
whether a merger proposal is in the public interest. For instance, it
long has been the policy of the Commission to look with favor upon
voluntary alignments between weak and strong roads. The purpose
of such a policy is to permit integration with a stronger system to
insure survival and to provide an opportunity for achievement of
a profitable operation. Because a railroad's existence is at stake, the
public "benefits" in securing its continued operation are substantial.
On the other hand, the "public interest" becomes a highly nebulous
term when applied to gigantic mergers of prosperous, competing
companies. The Commission must face the delicate task of weighing
the destruction of beneficial competition against increased efficiency
in operation, then balance them in terms of the public interest. In
such a situation, the ICC should, to fulfill its duty, make a con-
clusive holding on the competition issue based on concepts adapted
11' Seaboard Air Line R.R.-Control-Atlantic Coast Line R.R., - I.C.C.




from the antitrust laws. The extent to which competition would be
diminished then would become a dominant consideration in merger
hearings in which the benefits were uncertain or slight. This will
occur more often, of course, in mergers between successful com-
panies.
VI. THE OBJECTIVES OF MERGER
The parties proposing mergers today base their claims of public
benefit on substantial economies to be achieved through consolida-
tion, thus allowing railroads to compete more effectively with other
modes of transportation. Generally, the first step after preliminary
merger negotiations is to hire consulting engineers to make extensive
studies, which are to indicate both the method and amount of the
probable savings. Although the Commission re-examines the esti-
mates, most applicants feel that these studies are indispensable in
dealing with the ICC because of the aura of independence which
surrounds them. The purpose of this section is to examine these esti-
mates to determine if alternative ways short of consolidation exist
which would accomplish similar savings. As is apparent, the section
adopts the spirit of the McLean... dissent. That is, before granting
the antitrust exemption to proposals which lessen competition, the
agency should be satisfied that the proposed measures are necessary
and that reasonable alternatives to attain these objectives do not
exist.
Applicants in the C & O-B & 0 proceeding"' submitted estimates
of over thirteen million dollars annual savings over a five-year period.
Over ninety per cent of these savings were attributed to the consolida-
tion of offices, pooling of equipment, and consolidation of stations and
terminals. The dissent stated that "clearly those savings which are
expected to stem from the coordination projects could be obtained
just as easily through cooperative agreements.' '. Equipment pooling
(accounting for one-fourth of total savings) already had been started
prior to the decision on control and fairly could not be said to be a re-
sult of it. Furthermore, coordinated terminal and station operations
already existed between the C & 0, the B & 0, and the New York
Central, so no further savings could be achieved in this area (over
one-half of total savings).
Applicants in the Seaboard-Coast Line merger had a detailed esti-
120 321 U.S. 67, 92 (1944).
121 Chesapeake & 0. Ry.-Control-Baltimore & O.R.R., 317 I.C.C. 261 (1962),
aff'd sub mom. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees v. United States, 221 F.




mate of over thirty-eight million dollars annual savings.' Signifi-
cantly, the pooling of equipment and consolidation of stations and
terminals also were to achieve large estimated savings in this case. Pre-
sumably, these could be handled in a fashion similar to that suggested
in the C & O-B & 0 case. This technique also could be extended into
other areas, e.g., the elimination of duplicate lines and the consolida-
tion of heavy repair facilities. Although these techniques fall short of
merger, their primary purpose is to accomplish economies through the
direct destruction of competition. The advantage of such an ap-
proach over merger is that the Commission can consider specific
proposals. If the business level does not warrant another independent
carrier in a particular market, then an application should be ap-
proved. On the other hand, if the market can support several efficient
carriers, coordination programs should be discouraged.
Another objective of merger is to abandon lines and reduce the
number of employees. Indeed, it appears that because of the Com-
mission's restrictive policies the carriers feel the reshuffling incident
to a merger is the only way to accomplish such economies. Needless
to say, direct action is preferable when possible. Many abandonments
would not be possible without merger, but, with the piggyback de-
velopment in serving low density areas, a more liberal abandonment
policy is justified. Companies thus would be allowed to combat the
disease rather than its symptoms, which mergers attempt to attack.
The same reasoning applies to reducing the number of employees,
although the ICC would not have jurisdiction except in merger cases.
Another facet of this problem lies in the rate structure as enforced
by the ICC. A reason frequently used to justify the consolidation of
railroads into large regional systems is that a merger allows them to
compete effectively with other modes. The underlying theory is that
the fixed cost of larger companies is lower and justifies reduced rates.
Although this argument runs directly counter to Professor Healy's
'23 List of selected important items: In Thousands
Consolidation of stations and terminals $ 4,485
Elimination of duplicate lines 7,465
Effects of consolidation on lines retained 5,126
Duplicate freight service 1,413
Duplicate passenger service 1,234
Consolidation of offices, departments
and divisions including off line offices 10,266
Effect on income of shorter and more economical routes 2,553
Effect on income of solicitation of freight for longer hauls 4,910
Pooling of equipment 2,216
Consolidation of heavy repair facilities 2,228
Effect of consolidation on property taxes 1,000
Seaboard Air Line R.R.--Control-Atlantic Coast Line R.R., - I.C.C.
Finance Docket No. 21215, App. X (Dec. 2, 1963).
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findings on economies of scale,1" ' the disagreement is academic under
present regulatory policy. In some cases, railroads are prohibited from
pricing down to fully distributed cost. The value-of-service method
of determining rates and present levels of minimum rates may be the
source of this problem. If so, perhaps a more desirable solution than
large scale merger would be a re-examination of policies with an eye
toward more competitive rail rates.
VII. CONCLUSION
Three aspects of the present merger movement make it unique.
First, practically all major railroads are considering merger or are
engaged in merger litigation, with the development of regional sys-
tems a very real possibility. Second, the railroads' general motive is
the achievement of large savings through reduction of fixed cost.
Third, the ICC seems willing to achieve the estimated gains at the
expense of competition among the railroads.
The present movement has exposed several severe and pressing
problems in the railroad industry which require immediate Congres-
sional attention. Much of the legislation under which the ICC oper-
ates is out-moded to the extent that it creates problems in the indus-
try. Two of the most important areas are the rules which govern
abandonment procedures and those which sustain pricing through the
rate-bureau technique. These problems suggest that a complete re-
examination of the present legislation is desirable.
Even more damage has resulted from Congress' failure to provide
the ICC with any meaningful statement of the national transporta-
tion policy as it applies to the role competition should play in the
transportation industry. From the present regulatory legislation, one
might conclude that the benefits or detriments derived from pre-
serving competition are essentially the same in any regulated indus-
try. However, the economic facts do not support such a conclusion.
Congress should provide a more specific standard than the "public
interest" for the ICC to consider in merger applications.
Although Congress is at fault for failure to provide the ICC with
standards to apply to transportation mergers, the ICC has contri-
buted to the confusion by its nebulous approach to the issue. If the
preservation of competition is an important consideration in de-
termining the public interest, then the ICC is under a duty to explore
fully methods of achieving maximum benefits consistent with the
basic policy of preserving healthy competition. Realizing that certain




goals may clash with notions of preserving competition, the ICC is
under a further duty to develop a policy which specifically assigns
some weight to the competition issue relative to other benefits in a
proposed merger. These obligations have not been fulfilled. The ab-
sence of such a policy has had the result of making a precise determi-
nation on the competition issue in terms of the antitrust laws un-
necessary. This follows because even if antitrust concepts yield an
estimate of the anticompetitive effects of a merger, no identifiable
standard exists to evaluate the desirability of allowing merger not-
withstanding the ascertained effects.
A great deal of the savings sought through merger could be ac-
complished in other ways, such as pooling agreements. The other ob-
jectives sought to be obtained by merger reduce to an attempt to
avoid the unfortunate burdens imposed by out-moded regulatory
law. Such mergers are aimed only at the symptoms rather than at
the disease. The indication is that under a regulatory scheme which
had a more liberal abandonment and rate policy, certain mergers
might not be necessary or even desirable. Under present conditions,
however, railroads appear to have no alternative other than merger
to avoid difficult financial troubles.
In summary, while the basic source of policy should be Congress,
the ICC, to the extent that policy decisions have been delegated to
it, should attempt more precise holdings on the issues presented. A
recommendation which is directed to the development of a clearer
merger policy and more specific holdings is as follows:
(1) Congress should direct the ICC to deny all merger applications
which would substantially lessen competition unless it is satisfied that
the specific benefits of that merger are absolutely necessary in the public
interest and cannot reasonably be accomplished by alternative measures.
(2) Congress should require the ICC to make a specific finding based
on the antitrust laws and the cases under them to determine whether
competition has been substantially lessened. The decision as to whether
intermodal or intramodal transportation service constitutes the relevant
market should be made on a case by case basis under the antitrust
concepts.
The adoption of such legislation would place a heavy burden on
the ICC. Measurement of the effects a merger will have on various
markets and submarkets often wilt present complex problems.
Another difficulty exists with respect to a determination of the type
and amount of benefit which justifies substantial reduction of com-
petition. However, the objective sought is that the vital questions
at least be asked at the Commission level. Although the Commission
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will continue to draw on its expertise in answering these questions,
this approach has the value of exposing the Commission's weighing
process to judicial as well as public scrutiny. Furthermore, periodic
Congressional re-examination of transportation policy could be more
meaningful if the issues developed by the Commission were clearly
presented.
